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Seventy people attended the 2003 Annual Meeting, which was held at the Hilton Hawaiian Village, Waikiki, Hawaii. In addition to invited speakers and Legacy Award winners (please reference the attached agenda) attendees included representatives from the Canadian Coast Guard, Pacific Region; the US Coast Guard Districts 1, 11, 13, 14, and 17, as well as the Office of Response at USCG Headquarters and Marine Safety Office Honolulu; the Prince William Sound RCAC; the Cook Inlet RCAC; IBRRC; Foss Maritime; Smith Maritime; Crowley Marine; the Alaska Tanker Company; EPA Region 9; Rath Response; Clean Islands Council; Penco/AMC; NOAA at D11; Polar Tankers; Navy Region Hawaii; Hawaii Dept. of Fish & Wildlife; American Marine; and the National Response Council.
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Task Force Members or their delegates included:
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Carlton Moore, Interim Administrator, California Office of Spill Prevention & Response |
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Stan Norman, Spill Prevention Section Manager, Washington Department of Ecology |
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Gordon Macatee, Deputy Minister, British Columbia Ministry of Water, Land, and Air Protection |
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Laurence Lau, Deputy Director for Environmental Health, Hawaii Department of Health |
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Alaska and Oregon were not able to send representatives due to travel restrictions. Coordinating Committee members Scott Schaefer, Curtis Martin, and Heather Taylor also participated.
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Aloha and welcome to Hawaii. It is a pleasure to be with you today, and I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you about the significant issues before us as we work to maintain and improve the quality of our maritime environment.
As you know, I only just recently assumed command of the Fourteenth Coast Guard District, the largest district in the Coast Guard in terms of geography. Our marine environmental protection responsibilities cover the Hawaiian Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and numerous other islands spread throughout the Central and Western Pacific. Approximately 43 percent of our nation's Exclusive Economic Zone is contained within the District, covering an area of 1.4 million square miles. Hundreds of vessels are in transit each day throughout this area, some destined for US ports, but most in transit between Asia and North or South America. As you can imagine, our ability to even be aware of what's going on within this vast area is limited. Nevertheless, I am very proud of the efforts of the men and women of the Fourteenth District to ensure that are waters remain clean, safe and secure. The theme of this meeting is the sinking of the Tank Ship PRESTIGE and the associated issue of "places of refuge".
On November 13th, 2002, the Tank Vessel PRESTIGE encountered gale force winds in a storm off the coast of Spain. The vessel was carrying 77,000 tons of heavy fuel oil from Latvia to Gibraltar when it developed a crack in its 26-year old hull. The ship listed up to 50 degrees and trailed an oil slick visible for five miles. Helicopters recovered the crew. Rescue vessels attached a towline on the 17th attempt and pulled the stricken vessel further out to sea. Local port authorities had earlier refused to allow the PRESTIGE to enter a harbor. After six days of battering by wind and waves, the 797-foot PRESTIGE broke in half and sank in 11,000 feet of water. By November 20th, over 20,000 of the 77,000 tons of oil were estimated to have been released and officials remained worried about the remaining 57,000 tons. Many areas of Spain's northwest coast were coated with oil, severely impacting the area's rich fishing industry, tourism, and wildlife.
Obviously, no down wind or down current maritime locality is immune to the potentially adverse impacts of a severely damaged vessel. Severe weather played a role in creating the potential for the PRESTIGE calamity, but it was the failure to have an appropriate response plan that ultimately resulted in the disastrous environmental and economic effects. We in the Pacific must heed the painful lessons offered by the PRESTIGE, as we have from the tanker EXXON VALDEZ and the bulk carrier NEW CARISSA. We must take positive action to prevent or minimize future incidents and mitigate their impacts.
Prevention is certainly preferred to after-the-fact mitigation. Advanced weather prediction, engineering designs like double hulls, improvements in ship operations, stronger inspection procedures by flag and port states, and enhanced training of merchant mariners are a few examples of tools that can help reduce the risk of maritime accidents. Yet, we cannot engineer out the human element from daily operations. Too often, the human element becomes the weakest link in a chain of events that may result in disaster. And even with all our best efforts, accidents will still occur. We must be prepared to respond when they do. We must be prepared for a PRESTIGE scenario or some similar situation that will require a vessel to seek a harbor of safe refuge.
The IMO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation agreed upon a draft resolution with guidelines on places of refuge for ships in need of assistance. The guidelines are intended for use when a ship is in need of assistance but safety of life is not involved. Where safety of life is involved, the provisions of the SAR Convention are to be followed. The guidelines recognize that when a ship has suffered an incident, the best way of preventing pollution is to transfer the cargo and bunkers, and to repair the casualty. Such an operation is best carried out in a place of refuge. However, to bring such a ship into a place of refuge, near a coast, may endanger the coastal State, both economically and environmentally. Local authorities and populations may strongly object to the operation. The purpose of the guidelines is to provide masters, owners, salvors, and Member Governments with a framework to respond effectively with complementary efforts. In particular, an attempt has been made to arrive at a common framework for assessing the situation of ships in need of assistance. The guidelines on places of refuge for ships in need of assistance focus on oil spill response; they do not sufficiently address places of refuge in consideration of terrorism, mass rescue, marine firefighting, etc.
It is imperative that we stress the need for establishing places of refuge. The Coast Guard recognizes and supports this effort. In Hawaii there is a call to establish more than one refuge location within the Main Hawaiian Islands. Locals know the names of the ships INSIKO, EHIME MARU, INCE EXPRESS, LEGEND OF THE SEAS, SYBUS SINGAPURA. All have been significant cases that took a great deal of effort and risk to bring to resolution in part because there were no pre-identified and agreed upon locations of refuge or salvage. Harbors and ports are difficult for a variety of reasons. We must not limit ourselves to port facilities alone in our search for acceptable locations. An offshore area, in a lee, with suitable anchorage grounds, near an acceptable airport, but with port access through smaller vessels such as small passenger vessels, and tugs/barges would provide a suitable location where environmental, commercial and human activities are least affected.
A PRESTIGE-like incident will likely cross boundaries, both geographic and political. Unless it occurs near Hawaii or Guam, it will likely encompass more than one Captain-of-the-Port zone, possibly crossing state boundaries, and potentially crossing national boundaries. Such an event creates additional headaches beyond the normal cleanup problems. Issues like jurisdiction: who's in charge where, and torts and liabilities questions for different governments and government levels. For a trans-national event, movement of response personnel and equipment may become problematic. For example: Will personnel need approved visas before being allowed to respond? Will equipment be subject to potential customs or duties?
Public information is another area of critical importance. The public and the media want information....fast. In today's world of 24-hour news, it is not uncommon for the public to have information before the incident management team. If you don't provide them with information, they will seek it elsewhere, possibly from "less reliable" sources. Affected residents will also have concerns to voice or their own needs for information. Failure to include them can make even the best response appear inefficient.
Many issues, but few answers. We must use every appropriate tool in our toolbox to mitigate a maritime disaster. For spill response, these tools may include mounting a robust salvage effort to prevent the discharge of oil or hazardous substances from a damaged vessel, and the use of mechanical recovery, in-situ burning, dispersants, and other response techniques for substances that are discharged. Both Hawaii and Alaska have an additional response capability in the form of the dispersant spraying Airborne Dispersant Delivery System (ADDS) pack developed in partnership among the Coast Guard, state, and private sector. Here in Hawaii we have a tremendous asset at the Hawaii Oil Spill Center operated by the Clean Islands Council spill cooperative, as well as resources owned by the Marine Spill Response Corporation and other private sector oil spill response organizations. Unfortunately, similar capability does not exist anywhere else within the District.
From the U.S. Coast Guard perspective there are several tools that we can bring to bear on a PRESTIGE-type oil spill. LCDR Paul Albertson, the Coast Guard Headquarters presenter for this afternoon's panel will expand on this topic. Let me say that a primary tool is the Incident Command System or ICS. As you're well aware, the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS) ICS is a proven, workable response management system. ICS efficiently organizes personnel and equipment from one or multiple agencies, uniting them in a common effort. It is an all hazard-all risk approach to managing response operations. Since September 11th, ICS has received even wider acceptance. The White House issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD5) to enhance the government's ability to respond to domestic incidents through a single comprehensive national incident management system. HSPD5 calls for the development of a National Response Plan (NRP) and a National Incident Management System. That work is still under development. Additional tools include the Oil Spill Operations Guide, and the All Hazards Incident Management Handbook. I know that many of you participated in the work in 2000 and 2001 to update the "Field Operations Guide," and also provided valuable input to the follow-on "Handbook" and I thank you for your efforts.
How will we respond to a PRESTIGE oil spill? Many answers are already detailed within the local Area Contingency Plans (ACPs). The volume of text in the ACPs attests to the fact that many significant issues have already been thoroughly explored. Many of your discussions here today and tomorrow will need to be continued at the local Area Committees and Regional Response Teams and will result in even better ACPs. For a PRESTIGE-like event, the U.S. Coast Guard also stands ready to respond with several special teams. These include the National Strike Force, our three Strike Teams, Integrated Management Assist Teams and the District Response Groups. These teams of experts can be quickly mobilized to assist a response anywhere in the United States. One of the unique tools of the National Strike Force Teams is the Viscous Oil Pumping System or VOPS developed by the Coast Guard's Ocean Engineering Division. Both the PRESTIGE and the NEW CARISSA involved heavy fuel oils that are difficult to pump unless heated. The VOPS was successfully used in December 1999, after the derailment of a rail car causing Heavy Fuel Oil to be discharged into a frozen lake in Maine.
Should a tank vessel incur catastrophic damage in the Pacific, the resulting oil spill's severity, size, location, and public health or environmental impacts could be complex and require extraordinary coordination of federal, state, local, and responsible party resources for containment and clean up. This is the definition of a Spill of National Significance or SONS. In the EXXON VALDEZ case, the Captains of the Ports involved were quickly overwhelmed with requests by the media, VIPs, and in acquiring response resources from beyond their area of responsibility. The SONS response framework helps alleviate many of these problems by bringing in a senior level official for these tasks. Many of you were involved in the SONS exercise in Alaska in 2000, and will be involved in the next SONS exercise scheduled for April 2004 in Southern California. The National Incident Command/Regional Incident Command (NIC/RIC) protocol is designed to make the job of the FOSC/Incident Commander easier by ensuring their focus remains on incident response. The NIC/RIC would oversee overall management primarily focusing on strategic assistance, public affairs support, and resource competition.
In summary, although prevention is by far the best offense against environmental mishaps, maritime accidents will continue to happen. In response to maritime catastrophes, we've developed sophisticated tools and have worked cooperatively to improve our management systems and contingency plans. We've exercised these plans at the local level as well as nationally. Spurred on by the recent ecological tragedy wrought by the PRESTIGE, we now find ourselves focusing on identifying places of safe refuge to minimize environmental damage. Clearly there is much to be done to ensure the quality of our maritime environment. Working together we can accomplish great things. The Coast Guard looks forward to working with you on these issues, and I wish you a thoughtful and productive meeting. Thank you.
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The Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force presented four 2003 Legacy Awards for Oil Spill Prevention, Preparedness, and Response at its Annual Meeting. The 2003 Legacy Award winners are:
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The Regional Citizens' Advisory Council of Prince William Sound, Alaska
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Titan Maritime, LLC, headquartered in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida
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Sause Brothers Ocean Towing Company, headquartered in Coos Bay, Oregon
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Ms. Margot Brown of Alameda, California
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Legacy Awards are given to industry, non-profit or public agency organizations and individuals, or for team efforts. The Task Force gives Legacy Awards for projects, accomplishments, or leadership that demonstrates innovation, management commitment, and improvements in oil spill prevention, preparedness, or response resulting in enhanced environmental protection. Efforts to promote partnerships and involve the public are favored. Organizations, individuals, or projects nominated for the Legacy Award must be located or primarily operating in the Task Force jurisdictions of Alaska, British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, California, and Hawaii. Organizations or individuals representing a regulated industry must demonstrate a satisfactory history of compliance with state, provincial, and federal oil spill regulations.
See more details and photos on the 2003 Legacy Award winners...
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Rescue Tug: The 2003 Legislature provided five years of funding authorization. Revenue projections are a little uncertain, but key legislators promised to find the funding for the full five years of winter operation. The rescue tug Barbara Foss will deploy to Neah Bay on September 15th. The contract for the dedicated Neah Bay tug will be re-bid in the spring of 2004 for a four year period.
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Vessel Waste Oil Dumping: There are more than a dozen cases still pending. Stan noted that federal/state partnership on this issue is working well; DOE and the USCG co-sponsored a training seminar in Olympia in May. Stan also noted that the Kaede spill as a result of illegal waste oil discharge activities is costing the vessel's owners and operators more than $15,000 per gallon spilled.
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Contingency Plan Rule Making: Work continues on combining and updating Washington's 10 year old rules for vessels and oil-handling facilities. The current emphasis is on studies necessary to develop data and information for a thorough cost/benefit analysis.
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Drilltrac: DOE is beginning to implement this innovative training and competency program covering the Incident Command System and oil spill response management. The program was developed in conjunction with the USCG and EPA.
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Vessel Financial Responsibility: Thanks to the 2003 Legislature, Washington's financial responsibility (pollution insurance) requirements for vessels will soon be consistent with the world standard setter, California. The major change will be requiring $300M of coverage for large commercial non-tank vessels, ten times the federal OPA-90 requirement, which is grossly inadequate given the costs of oil spills today.
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Oil Spills: Spills from regulated vessels and facilities continue to decline in number and volume. Unfortunately, spills from vessels and facilities not regulated by the state continue to increase in both number and volume. Ecology and the USCG are using recently approved protocols to address this issue.
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Drug Labs: Mercifully, the number of drug labs requiring clean up by Ecology responders has leveled off and started to decline. This may be more as a result of decreased emphasis by law enforcement agencies than a decline in actual number of labs in operation, however.
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The Ministry of Water, Lands and Air Protection utilizes its environmental emergency management program to protect people, property and the environment from environmental hazards. This program is responsible for emergency planning and has on staff 18 trained Environmental Emergency Response Officers whose role it is to monitor the response activity at oil and hazardous material spill incidents. Organizationally, this program is part of the Environmental Protection Division, Regional Operations Branch.
We have, as a Ministry, recently moved to a high risk model for many aspects of our mandate. This affects the environmental emergency management program, in that we have developed and implemented a risk assessment tool to assess the severity of the spill incident and determine appropriate response action.
We are also developing and implementing an electronic integrated incident data reporting tool that will provide us with management reports, an analysis capability, and real time field data during spill response activity.
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Approximately 3500 environmental emergencies are reported to the ministry annually, mostly hazardous material spills and releases. Environmental Emergency Response Officers located in regional offices are available to respond to such spills and to monitor response activity. In our Headquarters office we have one Environmental Emergency Planner and one Operations Officer for planning and preparedness for large-scale incidents such as marine, freshwater and land based hazards.
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We support and monitor Coast Guard (US and Canadian) shipping and oil industry initiatives being implemented for oil spill prevention, preparedness and response.
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We are beginning to assess the shipping risks posed to the outer British Columbia coast by initiatives that include ever larger vessels and increased transits of shipping carrying crude and refined product within our twelve-mile limit.
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Potential risks also exist to our environment from bulk cargo and container vessels, carrying not only threatening substances, but huge amounts of fuel for operations.
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We are training, exercising and equipping four Incident Management Teams to enable us to adequately fulfill our responsibilities for monitoring response to a major incident.
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We are an associate member of Burrard Clean Operations for the purpose of improved response capability and to facilitate closer industry and government cooperation
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In accordance with our stewardship model, we are working to develop an enhanced responder capacity throughout the province. We will be working closely with industry and local government to ensure the capacity is in place to supplement our resources.
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We promote a unified command approach in marine oil spill response amongst jurisdictions and the responsible party.
We continue to maintain the coastal inventory and oil spill response information system for coastal protection and planning.
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There were 1312 oil spills reported in California in 2002; 101 met or exceeded the Task Force reporting threshold. Diesel and gas were the most common products spilled.
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Four settlements were negotiated on past marine spills.
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NRDA settlements were made for more than $112 million.
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The California RRT and six Area Committees have established dispersant pre-approval zones beyond 3 miles from shore, except in National Marine Sanctuary areas, where the decision would be made on a case-by-case basis.
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OSPR reviews oil spill contingency plans for 1,143 tank vessels including tank barges, for 5 offshore platforms in state waters, for 3,346 non-tank vessels, and for 50 marine oil terminals, including 12 refinery docks.
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Effective January 2003, Senate Bill 849 increased the state's per barrel fee to 5 cents/barrel to support the oil spill program and implemented a fee of $2,500 for non-tank vessels over 300 gross tons that is payable once every two years.
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OSPR has made unannounced drills a priority, and has conducted 23 so far this year. 20% of the unannounced notification drills on non-tank vessels have resulted in failure reports. OSPR is also using their drill program to rate oil spill response organizations operating in California.
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Salvage and oil removal operations are complete for the SS Jacob Luckenbach, a sunken vessel off San Francisco that had been leaking oil responsible for the deaths of thousands of common murres. There are 1600 sunken wrecks off the California coast, including a tanker off Moro Bay.
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OSPR is asking California's five Harbor Safety Committees to discuss "intentional" oil spills.
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The 2004 Spill of National Significance exercise will be held in Southern California next April. It will involve two spill scenarios, one each in San Diego and Los Angeles.
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Larry explained that the Hawaii Department of Health includes the Division of Environmental Health, and the Hazards Evaluation and Emergency Response (HEER) office is part of Environmental Health.
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HEER received 490 spill reports in 2002, forty of which required a state response and/or oversight.
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One of HEER's largest ongoing response actions involves cleanup of the Honolulu Harbor; Larry referred attendees to page 38 of the Task Force's 2003 Annual Report for details.
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The Division of Environmental Health stresses pollution prevention and partnering with other state agencies, federal agencies, and industry to achieve that goal. Other state agencies involved in oil spill prevention and response include the Dept. of Land and Natural Resources and the Dept. of Transportation, Harbors Division. Partnering means working together on planning, preparation, training, exercises, response, NRDA, and community outreach.
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Using a PowerPoint presentation, Larry provided an overview of Hawaii's response capacity including dispersant capability. He noted that Hawaii has one of only six ADDs (Aerial Dispersant Delivery System) packs available worldwide. The Clean Islands Council and the Marine Spill Response Corporation both have oil spill response vessels stationed in Honolulu, and both are capable of dispersant applications. Helicopter platforms are also available.
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The USCG and state agencies have worked with industry to develop the Hawaii Area Contingency Plan which includes Geographic Response Strategies for all the islands. Planning has also included working with the hotel industry to train them how to deal with their guests, protect the facility, and access the response management system in the event of a spill.
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The Hawaii Spill Response Center on Sand Island sponsors over 50 courses each year. These are taught by the USCG, Clean Islands Council, NOAA, USFWS, and consultant specialists. It is also used as the island's command center in the event of a spill.
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HEER also works with industry - Tesoro, Chevron, Shell, utilities - to organize, prepare, and help participate in their annual PREP exercises.
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In one NRDA restoration activity, Larry noted, the responsible party removed 20 tons of derelict fishing nets from the coastline of the island of Kauai; the waste nets were then chopped and burned in a garbage-to-energy plant on the island.
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The Environmental Quality Commission adopted rules related to Oil Spill Contingency Planning, Emergency Response, Enforcement and Ballast Water. House Bill 2150 (HB 2150) was passed by the Oregon legislature during the 2001 session and amended laws related to oil spill planning fees that provide funding for the oil spill prevention program, clarified the role of the state on-scene coordinator, consolidated financial responsibility requirements, requires oil spill contingency plans for inland pipelines and directed DEQ to create a work group to examine the benefits of preparedness planning and response strategies for inland facilities. This bill was crafted in coordination with the maritime and petroleum community. Senate Bill 895 required DEQ to adopt rules related to ballast water management.
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M/V NEW CARISSA
- Lawsuit: "A Coos County jury... found the owners of the New Carissa guilty of negligent trespass and awarded Oregon $25 million to pay for removing the shipwreck's rusting 1,500-ton stern, mired in sand off the beach in Coos Bay." (The Oregonian, 14 November 2002) According to press reports the owners have agreed to pay the $25 million, but the state will hold the payment in an account pending an appeal of the verdict.
- Natural Resource Damage Assessment: The trustees continue to conduct restoration planning and studies to refine the extent of seabird injury.
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DEQ received 2,343 spill notifications from the Oregon Emergency Management Division in 2002.
- There were only 40 spills to navigable waters of the state, 34 involved petroleum products;
- There were only two (2) oil spills from regulated facilities or covered vessels; and
- Thirty four (34) spills were from fishing vessels or other harbor craft.
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The most significant spill during the year was an inland spill from a petroleum tank truck. The response activities began when a tanker crashed December 5 on Highway 22, spilling 11,000 gallons of gasoline on the road just above Detroit Lake
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DEQ and the USCG Marine Safety Office Portland hosted the Area Committee and Regional Response Team Meeting in Portland on June 11-12. The local outreach portion of the meeting focused on a tabletop exercise involving a terrorist takeover of a ship in the Columbia River headed into port. In addition to law enforcement and security issues, fire and pollution aspects were examined. Key players in the exercise were representatives from the USCG, FBI, Oregon State Police, DEQ, Washington Department of Ecology, Oregon Office of Emergency Management, Multnomah County Emergency Management and Portland Fire/Emergency Management.
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Response: During the period from January 1 through March 31, 2003, ADEC staff received 427 oil and hazardous substance release reports. Two hundred and ninety-five of these reports were minor spills that did not require follow-up actions. A telephone follow-up was required for 75 of these spills, while 57 required a field response. Spill summaries, including photos and situation reports, for eight of the most significant responses are available for general viewing at the PERP website: http://www.state.ak.us/dec/dspar/perp/home.htm.
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F/T American Eagle Spill: The 43-foot fishing tender American Eagle capsized at approximately 1:00 a.m. on June 25, 2003 near Russian Point in southern Cook Inlet with an estimated 400 gallons of diesel fuel onboard. A scheduled commercial set-gillnet fishery and a subsistence fishery had to be closed as a result of the capsizing while a vessel salvage plan was being developed.
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F/V Windy Bay Oil Spill Settlement: The Alaska Department of Law negotiated a civil settlement on behalf of ADEC in the amount of $77,486.02 for reimbursement for response and cleanup costs related to the sinking of the M/V Windy Bay on August 4, 2001. This incident resulted in the release of 35,000 gallons of diesel into Prince William Sound.
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F/V Genei Maru #7 Grounding Settlement: The State received $41,232.69 from the owners of the fishing vessel Genei Maru #7. The 97-foot Japanese fishing vessel grounded in November 2002 on Afognak Island after drifting unmanned in the Pacific Ocean for nearly six months after an onboard fire. An extensive response removed the leaking fuel and other hazardous materials from the grounded vessel. The wreck was cut up and removed from the grounding site in June 2003 by the salvage company Magone Marine of Dutch Harbor.
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Prince William Sound Spill Drill: ADEC and the U.S. Coast Guard jointly conducted an unannounced equipment deployment exercise in Prince William Sound on June 4, 2003. Objectives included effective task force management, barge operation, skimmer operation, site control, decontamination, and oil recovery by the on-water task force. Extensive lessons learned were gathered, and ADEC is following up with the plan holder and response contractor to determine corrective actions and timelines. Significant equipment deployment exercises were also held in Southeast Alaska and in Cook Inlet during May 2003.
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Contingency Plan Review Project: ADEC contingency plan staff are engaged in a project to update contingency plan requirements for oil exploration and production facilities. The goals of the project are (1) to review and evaluate existing contingency plan requirements to eliminate ambiguity or the possibility of conflicting interpretations and (2) to improve clarity and certainty through clear and consistently-applied contingency plan requirements. Public meetings were held in Anchorage and Barrow in May and June 2003. ADEC is currently evaluating comments received through an informal review period before finalizing a formal draft of proposed regulations changes that will be the subject of a public comment period later this year.
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Non-tank Vessel Regulations Implementation: Alaska's new nontank vessel oil spill contingency plan regulations became effective November 27, 2002 and affected parties had until May 27 of this year to comply with the new requirements. As of June 2003, four nontank vessel cleanup contractors, five nontank vessel incident management teams, and seven response planning facilitators have been approved under the new requirements. One hundred and sixty-eight plan applications have been received, all but one of which are "streamlined" plan applications under the new law. Three hundred and eighteen nontank vessels are currently approved under these plans for operation in Alaska State waters.
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Task Force Executive Coordinator Jean Cameron presented an overview of Task Force activities, past and planned, noting that Task Force activities are implemented under three objectives: Spill Prevention, Spill Preparedness and Response, and Communications. She referred attendees to the 2003 Annual Report for a complete review of accomplishments by the Task Force and its member agencies over the past year.
Addressing the Database project under the Spills Prevention objective, she explained that a Data Dictionary had been adopted by the Task Force Members in 1997 which focused on generating information re: spill causes. The Task Force organizes periodic training for member agency investigators in order to insure consistent application of the Data Dictionary terms. Such a training event was sponsored by California OSPR and the Task Force in February 2003. She also reported that a Database Workgroup of member agency representatives, chaired by Jack Barfield of WA Ecology, is working to incorporate the Data Dictionary terms into their own databases and to transfer data to Jack for a regional database. Jean reported that the total spill volume for the Pacific States/BC Oil Spill Task Force region in 2002 was 376,358 gallons, which includes all spills of greater than 42 gallons to either water or land. She then reviewed the 2002 spill data compiled by the Workgroup and illustrated in the 2003 Annual Report (pdf file 732k).
Regarding implementation of the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management project recommendations, Jean reported that notes have now been placed on the appropriate navigation charts referring mariners to their Coast Pilots or Sailing Directions for the details of the Workgroup's recommendations to transit the US and Canadian West Coast at either 25 or 50 nm offshore depending on their vessel type. For their invaluable assistance with these implementation steps, Jean recognized and thanked CDR Stephen J. Danscuk, Chief, Marine Transportation Branch, U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area; Skip Stembel, Chief, Coast Pilot Branch/NOAA; and Rick Holly of the California Office of Spill Prevention and Response, Project Co-Chair for the Task Force. Jean also noted with pride that ADM Thomas Collins, the Commandant of the USCG, had recently presented information on the Offshore Project to his counterparts in Russia as a model. Read WCOVTRM Final Report.
Under Stan Norman's leadership and working with CAPT Scott Glover of the USCG Pacific Area, the Task Force met with various West Coast tanker operating companies to discuss adoption of voluntary spill prevention standards which go beyond regulatory requirements. Several of the TAPS operators are doing so already; for example, both SeaRiver Maritime and the Alaska Tanker Company have received ECOPRO certification from the WA DOE. The tank vessel operators recommended including non-tank vessels in the Task Force outreach as well, and agreed, in support of our outreach to a larger constituency, to rank "Best Industry Practices" in order of effectiveness in spill prevention. That ranking is available in the 2003 Annual Report (pdf file 732k).
Jean explained that other spill prevention projects receiving ongoing support include:
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The Pacific Oil Spill Prevention Education Team (POSPET), chaired by Eric Olsson of Washington Sea Grant
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Monitoring double hull conversions of the TAPS tankers, which is done by Laura Stratton at the WA DOE and available on the DOE website. Read TAPS Tanker Report. Jean noted that all TAPS tankers will be double-hulled by 2008, and only three of these will not have "super-redundant" steering and propulsion systems.
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She further explained that the Task Force Coordinating Committee also monitors various spill prevention Topics of Concern such as cruise ship operations, spill prevention research and development, bunkering and oil transfer standards; California's development of a "threat matrix" to prioritize oil spill risks from sunken vessels, illegal bypasses of oil/water separator systems on vessels, and ort and facility Best Available Protection standards.
Reviewing Task Force accomplishments over the past year under the Preparedness and Response objective, Jean announced that the Coordinating Committee had completed their 2-year analysis of the key elements needed in contingency plans for the next decade. Their project goals were to:
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Simplify contingency planning, promote consistency and harmony, and encourage innovation by:
- Developing streamlined plans for vessels as has been developed for non-tank vessels in Alaska
- Using electronic formats for plan submittal
- Making plans consistent with area contingency plans and the area planning process
- Allowing for electronic references to existing plans and documents as appropriate to meet information requirements
- Promoting standardization among member agencies and with federal agencies
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To improve preparedness/response by:
- Reducing agency resources spent on plan review so that more can be invested in drills, inspections, OSRO certifications, etc.
- Addressing gaps and changes in response paradigms
- Providing for continuous improvement
- Making spill response more efficient
- Verifying and/or certifying spill response providers referenced in a contingency plan
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After Jean's review the Task Force Members signed a Resolution to promote the goals of simplicity, consistency, innovation, and improved preparedness and response. In order to do so, they agreed that their agencies would incorporate these Recommended Contingency Planning Elements into future revisions to their contingency planning regulations as applicable.
Read Resolution on Contingency Planning Elements and Contingency Plan Elements report (pdf file 50k).
Ongoing projects under the Preparedness/Response objective include maintaining the Integrated Vessel Response Plan format as needed (adopted in 1998) and maintaining the 1-800-OILS-911 spill reporting number for the non-regulated sector. This number is available in BC, WA, OR, CA; when a recreational boater calls it, they're put through to the emergency management office for the area from which they're calling. From August 2002 through the end of June 2003, 127 calls were made on this system.
The Coordinating Committee also monitors Preparedness/Response Topics of Concern such as unannounced drill programs, salvage capabilities and regulations, and response training standards for member agency personnel.
Under their Communications Objective, Jean explained that the Task Force had involved key stakeholders in a variety of ways over the past year, including:
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This Annual Meetings and Roundtable
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The Legacy Awards program
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Meetings with key US and Canadian federal agencies
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Maintaining a website in order to post event notices, newsletters, annual reports, project reports, and requests for comments
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Submitting consensus comments on federal rulemaking proposals
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Responding to information requests
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Participating on the Navigation Safety Advisory Council and the USCG/AWO Pacific Area Quality Steering Committee
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Attending the American Petroleum Institute's Spills Advisory Group meetings
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Presentations at the International Oil Spill Conference (IOSC) and the Shipowners Cooperative Program
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Hosting a booth at the IOSC this year
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Mailings announcing events and a request for Legacy Award nominations
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Jean Cameron then outlined priority elements of the Task Force's 2003-2004 Annual Work Plan (pdf file 388k). Under the Spill Prevention Objective, the Database Project Workgroup will:
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Refine data submittals consistent with the Task Force Data Dictionary, with particular focus on refining applications of the terms "other" and "unknown"
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Refine causal investigations and information entered into the database to achieve an appropriate level of specificity that also conforms to the collection capabilities of member agencies
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Collaborate to design an Access-based user interface that facilitates import of data submissions by member agencies as well as analysis of the regional information for trends and causal factors
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Evaluate holding an investigator training course in Alaska during this work year
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Jean also explained that the Task Force would continue to work with representatives of the US Coast Guard Pacific Area, the Canadian Coast Guard, and Transport Canada to implement the West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Workgroup's recommendations including:
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Putting AIS on ocean-going tugs and getting tug location information to US West Coast COTPs
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Monitoring compliance with voluntary recommended distances offshore
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Improving information on vessel transits
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For the USCG, implementing the F/V safety plan
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Adoption of a regional ballast water exchange standard
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Adoption of the Puget Sound Vessel Pre-arrival/Departure Standard of Care in other West Coast ports
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The Task Force plans to communicate the top-ranked industry recommendations to prevent oil spills during vessel and tug/tank barge operations through publication on the Task Force web site and through media outreach. They also plan to organize at least one panel presentation on the topic, either as the Task Force Winter 2004 Roundtable or using another industry forum as available.
The Task Force will also discuss adopting a resolution promoting consistently high pollution prevention standards for cruise ships operating in our shared waters. This project will be done by the Coordinating Committee.
Under the Spill Preparedness/Response objective in the new Work Plan, the Task Force hopes to partner with the US Coast Guard and the Canadian Coast Guard and/or Transport Canada to assemble a stakeholder workgroup that will develop recommendations to address the decisions necessary to grant refuge for purposes of repair to a vessel leaking, or having the potential to leak, oil or other hazardous substances. The Workgroup would identify decision-making procedures, including what organizations and interests would be represented in the decision-making process, identify advance planning steps which can be taken to facilitate this decision-making process, and submit these recommendations to appropriate authorities for the US and Canadian west coasts and Hawaii.
Jean also noted that in late June the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure had unanimously approved the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2003 (H.R. 2443). Among its provisions was one requiring that non-tank vessels over 400 gross tons have oil spill response plans similar to those required of tank vessels. If a similar version is approved by the Senate and the USCG adopts regulations to implement this authority, Jean stated that the Task Force would probably be actively involved in review of and comment on such regulations.
Under their 2003-2004 Communications Objective the Task Force will continue all the outreach activities described above, plus will add two new initiatives:
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Updating their web site: Jean thanked the BC Ministry of Water, Land, & Air Protection for setting up and maintaining the current site over the past five years, with special thanks to Stafford Reid. She noted that the Task Force now has funding to hire a "web master" to set up a new site with a more intuitive web address and more interactive format.
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The Task Force will also develop a new 5-year Strategic Plan. The current plan covers 1999-2004, so the Coordinating Committee and Jean will work with the Task Force Members to have the 2004-2009 plan ready for their adoption at next year's Annual Meeting.
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...
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The Annual Meeting luncheon was co-hosted by the Task Force and the Clean Islands Council. Power Point and video presentations were given by Dr. Michael Ziccardi, Director of California's Oiled Wildlife Care Network on the topic of oiled wildlife care during the Prestige oil spill response. A presentation outline follows:
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T/V Prestige: 26 year old single hulled tanker
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"Ownership" issues:
- Registry: Bahamian by Liberian company
- Ship management: Greek
- Transport charter: Russian company based in Switzerland
- Fuel: British ownership
- Delivery: from Latvia to Singapore
- Crew: Greek captain and Filipino crew
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30 October: Left St. Petersburg, stopped in Latvia to collect 70,000 tons of fuel oil, stopped in Denmark to collect ship fuel
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7 November: Set sail for Singapore
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13 November: Hole developed in hull below waterline during storm, crew airlifted to safety
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14 November: 11,000 tons leaked to this point
- Ship secured to 2 tugs to keep from drifting to shore
- Salvage company requests to bring into sheltered waters to boom/skim/offload cargo & repair
- Spanish authorities refuse to grant request, require tugs to tow back to sea, deploy naval frigates to ensure compliance
- Portugal refuses similar request
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19 November: Ship breaks in half and sinks 150 miles off coastline; at least 56,000 tons of fuel sink with one half of ship
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15 Nov: SEO/BirdLife and the Spanish wildlife authority (Xunta de Galicia) call for international assistance with situation assessment.
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International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) dispatches two-person assessment team to A Coru–a
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International Bird Rescue Research Center (IBRRC) heads up IFAW Emergency Response team
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17 Nov: 100 live birds reported; 15 at A Coru–a (Santa Cruz), 85 at facility in Pontevedra
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19 Nov: Animal care meeting at A Coru–a
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Majority of wildlife operations to be handled at A Coru–a, with WWF/SEO to manage facility for live and dead birds
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IFAW team to develop larger facility at Pontevedra to act as primary facility
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20 Nov: Facility (forestry building) found
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80 live birds arrive at A Coru–a; 160 total
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21 Nov: Additional IFAW personnel arrive & continue developing facility
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OWCN offers assistance through the Alliance
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22 Nov: Facility in place, 100 animals transported from A Coru–a facility (70 remaining)
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Search continues for larger facility
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24 Nov: Spanish government OKs additional orgs assistance
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289 live birds in care
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Cleaning about to start, although there are water quantity/quality issues
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A consortium of oiled wildlife care organizations agreeing to work cooperatively during responses
- US: OWCN, IBRRC, IFAW, TSBRR
- Europe: RSPCA, Sea Alarm, Earthkind
- Others: Queensland Parks, NZ, CRAM, Wildcare
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Benefits
- Standardization of care/protocols
- Pooling of resources
- Training of participants
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Administration: Wildlife Health Center, UC Davis
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Partnership with California Department of Fish & Game, OSPR
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Mission: To provide best achievable treatment to wildlife exposed to oil
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Programs
- Oiled wildlife response
- Establish/maintain facilities
- Training program
- Competitive grant program
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26 Nov - 8 Dec:
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Additional live birds collected throughout areas
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Approx. 350 live at Pontevedra on 8 Dec.
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Weather and sea patters continue to drive oil to coastline, but more northeasterly
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Stabilization facilities developed at University of Lugo, Vigo, Isles de Cies & Ons
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Animals being transported to Pontevedra
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Animal processing becoming more organized, though cleaning large numbers still a problem
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More pools set up to increase clean bird holding
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9 Nov - 22 Dec:
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Clean birds slowly begin to be released (in Portugal)
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Clean birds space in Pontevedra filling up
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Oiled bird intakes increase, then slow in Galicia by 18 Dec, though increase in other provinces
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Facilities developed in Asturias & Cantabria by SEO
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23 Dec - 13 Jan:
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Oiled birds continue to come in but more slowly
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IFAW staff develop plans to demobilize and hand over care to Xunta & GREFA
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Bird Life: Estimated 100,000 to 200,000 seabirds affected
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Shoreline: As of 28 Jan, 654 beaches affected
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Economic:
- 915 km coastline closed to fishing, affecting over 90,000 people
- Galician fishing industry worth 300 million euros/yr
- Cleanup costs exceed $100 million, some estimate final cost over $1 billion
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Communication
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Wildlife authority, goverment, other organizations
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Facilities & Equipment
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Permanent vs. build-to-suit (water, power, space)
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Availability of specialized equipment (pools)
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Politics
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International, national, regional
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Lack of contingency plans
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Legislative
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Consideration of a shortened time to double-hull requirements
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Facilities & equipment
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Permanent facilities being planned in Pontevedra
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Planning
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Contingency planning by Xunta
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Photos courtesy of Curt Clumpner, IFAW, Joan Embery
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Video coverage courtesy of Soames Summerhayes
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Web sites for more information:
www.owcn.org
www.ifaw.org
www.panda.org
www.seo.org
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...
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Scott Schaefer, Deputy Administrator for the Office of Spill Prevention and Response, California Department of Fish and Game, moderated a panel discussion addressing the theme of the Task Force's 2003 Annual Meeting: The Prestige Spill: What if it happened in the Pacific Area? Panelists were asked to focus on our ability to respond to an offshore oil spill the size of the Prestige event.
Kim Beasley, General Manager, Clean Islands Council, noted that preparing for a major spill requires partnerships between government and industry; a failed response would reflect poorly on both. He then discussed the general capabilities of coops on the West Coast and Hawaii to respond to a major offshore event and any mutual aid agreements which supplement that capability.
Kim reviewed Clean Islands' Council response capabilities, which involve partnering with industry, the Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC), the State of Hawaii, and the US Coast Guard (USCG). He noted that the Association of Petroleum Industry Coop Managers (APICOM) - which includes coops in North America, England, Guam, and Australia - has a mutual aid agreement in place, should outside support be needed. Industry also has mutual aid agreements to share specialized personnel. He also noted resources available from the USCG Strike Teams and RRTs, plus through the Pacific States/BC Oil Spill Task Force Mutual Aid Agreement (pdf file 228k) and various BOAs with state and federal agencies, noting that "all of these are at various levels of workability."
There are, however, some inherent limitations to our response capability, Kim noted. Not all states have contracts with coops, and not all coops have contracts with the USCG. Coops may or may not be available to backfill for other coops who do have BOAs, since local standards may limit how much equipment could be moved out for the purpose of mutual aid. Kim also explained that coop equipment is not necessarily available to non-members, which could present problems if a coop were asked to respond to a spill from a tanker in "innocent passage" like the T/V Prestige. He advised that "response community members need to continue to reexamine and develop advanced protocols for cascading resources, protocols which are flexible and encourage partnering."
Mike LaTorre, Western Regional Vice President, Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC) discussed MSRC's offshore response capabilities and stated that MSRC is ready to deal with a catastrophic event. He described MSRC's mechanical recovery capability; booms, skimming, and storage capabilities are all available in Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, and California. In total, MSRC has 53 skimming systems capable of skimming 275,273 bbl/day (EDRC) plus 153,681 feet of boom. MSRC also has five oil spill response vessels in each of these locations which can serve as command and control centers while also skimming, heating, separating, and storing oil on board. Each OSRV has a 4,000 bbls temporary storage capacity.
MSRC maintains five barges co-located with the OSRVs in the Pacific Area; the average size is 39,000 bbls. Mike noted that the barges could also be used for lightering in a salvage operation. Altogether, MSRC has 292,500 bbls of storage capacity on the West Coast. In addition, MSRC subcontracts with 34 companies at 49 locations, known as their "Stars Contractors." MSRC trains their personnel and outfits them with skimmers and storage bladders.
MSRC anticipates possible changes in their dispersant capability on the West Coast, pending final USCG regulations, but currently each OSRV is equipped with 600 gallons of COREXIT 9527, which would treat approximately 300 bbls of oil. In addition, MSRC maintains In-Situ Burn kits in Honolulu, HI; Carson, CA; and Port Angeles, WA.
Mike also explained that MSRC has 23 telecommunications specialists nationwide, 5 of which are located in the Western Region. Of 6 mobile communications suites nationwide, three are in the Western Region. These suites provide marine and aviation frequencies, dedicated satellite access, and a telephone system with 21 trunk lines and 100 phone lines. Up to three suites can be accessed simultaneously. MSRC's OSRVs also have radio and satellite access capabilities.
Kevin J Gardner, President/General Manager, Burrard Clean Operations (BCO) /Western Canada Marine Response Corporation then discussed response capabilities in Western Canada. Kevin explained that industry pays for preparedness in Canada, and also pays for and manages any response. The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) will monitor the response and take over if necessary. Provincial officials and Environment Canada will advise the On-scene Coordinator regarding response priorities.
Pursuant to the Canada Shipping Act (CSA), Burrard Clean Operations must be certified by the Canadian Coast Guard on a 3-year cycle. BCO's customer base includes approximately 1600 members. All tankers over 150 GWT and ships over 400 GWT operating in BC waters must have an arrangement with BCO, according to the CSA, and all oil handling facilities on the Canadian west coast must also have an arrangement.
BCO has developed 7 response scenarios that cover the BC coast; each scenario addresses area sensitivities, location of an Incident Command Post, local contacts, staging areas, vessel launch locations, helicopter landing spots, protection/treatment strategies, equipment resources in the area, and logistical support services.
BCO's Coast Guard Certification requires the following exercises:
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Annual: 150 ton equipment deployment and a 1,000 ton table-top
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Every 2 years, a 2,500 ton equipment deployment exercise
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Every 3 years, a 10,000 ton table-top scenario
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In addition, BCO participates in member exercises, annual Coast Guard CANUSPAC and CANUSDIX exercises, and cross-border/mutual aid exercises with Clean Sound and SEAPRO.
In addition to training their own personnel, BCO trained and exercised with more than 100 contractors last year, including their Fishermen's Oil Spill Emergency Team (FOSET). BCO also uses forest service crews for shore-side responses when they're available (usually in the winter months). All BCO staff and contractors train in ICS; BCO has put together a checklist to guide them through a response. BCO has also developed guidelines and a checklist for an RP to use during a response.
Kevin noted that BCO's oil recovery capacity is certified at approximately 10,000 tons, and reviewed specific BCO equipment available, explaining that all BCO equipment has been selected for use in BC waters, including sheltered and unsheltered areas, shorelines, and ports. BCO has 18 vessels, ranging from small skiffs to the largest dedicated oil skimming vessel in Canada, as well as numerous barges for work platforms and/or temporary storage of recovered oil. There are 40 response equipment trailers placed around the Province, plus a mobile command center and 3 additional trailers of equipment ready to roll.
BCO can operate offshore with a number of their response vessels, depending on weather conditions. They also have boom, skimmers, and command center resources available. Provincial Forestry equipment available includes aircraft for monitoring and dispersant applications.
Kevin concluded, however, that a large offshore response could require cascading equipment in from other locations, both in and outside of the Province, and stated that BCO has developed partnership arrangements with a number of government and non-government agencies that would facilitate such mutual aid arrangements.
With the number of vessels plying BC's waters, Kevin noted, we are statistically overdue for a major incident. Over 4,800 ocean-going vessels enter the Strait of Juan de Fuca every year, carrying over 15 billion gallons of oil as either cargo or fuel.
Richard Wright, President, Clean Sound Cooperative, Inc. then gave the US perspective on mutual aid and transboundary responses with Canada. He began by noting a tradition of cooperation between Canada and the US as evidenced by the Canada/US oil spill Joint Contingency Plan and regional annexes at the government level as well as mutual aid agreements between BCO and Clean Sound as well as BCO and the Southeast Alaska response organization (SEAPRO).
Richard shared a number of photos of Clean Sound and BCO personnel training and deploying equipment together. He noted that they also drill together through both equipment deployment exercises and tabletop drills. In addition, they've facilitated agreements between US and Canadian customs and immigration services and double-checked that their response equipment will function together. They even purchase equipment cooperatively, he explained.
Richard is confident that they are prepared for any transboundary spill event.
Tim Holmes, Eleventh Coast Guard District Environmental Protection Specialist, addressed US/Mexico transboundary arrangements. He explained that the MEXUSPLAN was signed in 2000; this is the "Joint Contingency Plan between Mexico and the United States Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances."
The regional annexes were signed this year (2003); these include the MEXUSGULF and MEXUSPAC, which covers US and Mexican transboundary waters in the Pacific. MEXUSPAC covers coordination and command, planning, operations, and logistics. In connection with the annex signing in February, a tabletop exercise focused on: Roles & responsibilities during an international spill response; Spill notifications; Communications; Transportation of equipment & personnel; and Funding.
Tim discussed issues associated with a Prestige-type event, should one occur near the US/Mexican border on the Pacific. One such issue would be the use of dispersants near the border. He explained that MSO San Diego now has pre-approval to use dispersants in Federal waters (3-200 mi) with a 3 mile buffer zone north from the U.S./Mexican border. The 3 mile buffer zone requires RRT9 approval. Notification to Mexico of the use of dispersants within this buffer zone is recommended, but not required; he noted that Mexico is reluctant to allow dispersants in their waters. Tim also noted that US response contractors may have problems with responding across the border in Mexico, due to concerns about liability issues (personnel, equipment) and logistics (transportation, border crossing issues).
Tim believes that USCG Captains of the Port are likely to provide safe refuge to a vessel in light of the Prestige incident, but Mexico may be reluctant to allow safe refuge to a vessel faced with a Prestige situation due to the potential environmental and economic impacts to the port and surrounding sensitive areas. He anticipates that the Mexican Navy would activate the MEXUSPAC for US assistance. The Mexican National Contingency Plan (which provides for funding & other agency assistance) is also likely to be activated.
Dick Fairbanks, President, Titan Maritime, LLC then reviewed the salvage capabilities available on the US and Canadian West Coasts and in Hawaii. He began by noting that, unlike spill response, there are no final regulations in the US requiring salvage contracts (although draft regulations have been proposed by the USCG). There are no salvage coops, either, but the American Salvage Association has been formed as a trade organization; west coast members include Crowley, Parker, and American.
It's harder and harder to justify investments in salvage equipment and operations when there are so few incidents. Without contract requirements and response standards in place under OPA 90, salvage companies have not been required to invest and have become more reliant on spot market availability for resources.
A large ship requires approximately 100 tons of bollard pull to tow it or even stop its drift in a 30 knot wind. Spot market salvage assets are not always available, he explained, and may already be under contract. He displayed a list of the ocean-going tugs in the Pacific Area with over 5000 hp (read the Task Force West Coast Offshore Vessel Traffic Risk Management Project Report, Appendix H) (pdf file 68k), but noted that most are already working on any given day. If it were necessary to use foreign-flag vessels for a salvage operation, Dick noted that US law allows Customs to waive US flag requirements, although approval may be required from the Department of Defense.
Regarding shipboard firefighting, Richard explained that the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (1973) states that the senior fire service officer in whose jurisdiction the fire occurs will serve as the Incident Commander for any vessel fire, whereas the USCG would be expected to maintain an interest and assist as appropriate. "Under this paradigm, why should a salvor invest in firefighting equipment?" he asked. Dick displayed a map showing the locations of fireboats owned by fire departments or port authorities on the West Coast as of January 2002. These included three with 3000-6000 gpm capacity and 13 capable of more than 6000 gpm.
The T/V Prestige needed to be lightered; lightering requires the availability of tank barges certified for oil or petroleum products. He noted that, outside the commercial lightering areas, the only dedicated emergency response barges are those of MSRC and NRC. These barges are certified for oil, which is fine in an oil spill response, but wouldn't work for lightering some other type of hazardous chemical.
Dick closed by stating that "the United States must find the ways and means to support and encourage salvage investments, and strong salvage regulations would help."
LCDR Paul Albertson from the USCG Office of Response discussed the US's overall ability to manage a large spill response. He began by explaining that the National Contingency Plan (NCP) was actually a regulation, and it establishes how a response will be handled.
The NCP establishes the role of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator to coordinate or direct response and oversee area planning. It establishes 13 Regional Response Teams which are responsible for regional resources and technical advice. The National Response Team, made up of 16 federal agencies, has authority to coordinate national resources and give technical advice. The NCP established ICS as the response organization of choice for oil spill response, and the USCG has expended ICS to all emergency response situations. He referenced the Incident Managment Handbook as the latest iteration of the FOG manual.
He explained that an event like the Prestige spill would be considered a Spill of National Significance (SONS). SONS exercises are conducted every two years, rotating locations around the country. In a large incident affecting more than one USCG Captain of the Port area, a Regional Incident Command, or even a National Incident Command would be established. (NOTE: The 2004 SONS will drill a RIC/NIC event).
LCDR Albertson also explained that the Department of Homeland Security had been given a Presidential Directive to develop a National Response Plan (NRP) and a National Incident Management System (NIMS). The NRP will be a single all hazards/all disciplines plan that integrates the NCP with other plans, but maintains the same emphasis on awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. No significant change is anticipated to the on-scene use of NIIMS ICS.
The following points were made by audience and panel members during a discussion which followed the panel presentations:
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Skimmers are available that can deal with heavy oils
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Area plans for California and the Northwest include volunteer management plans
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Coops and MSRC can handle near-shore response operations if their vessels can come in
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The Clean Islands Coop has 70% near-shore capability and 30% offshore
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Concern was expressed regarding security procedures slowing response operations
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MSRC's ability to cascade OSRVs within the Pacific area is limited only by vessel speeds and local regulations regarding minimum response coverage requirements
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Response to a large spill event would require a lot of trained personnel, which might be a problem
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Coordination of communications during a large event will be a key issue
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...
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Following the panel presentations and audience discussion, the Task Force Members signed an authorization to formally adopt the 2003-2004 Annual Work Plan (pdf file 228k).
Before adjourning the meeting, Laurence Lau, our 2003 Annual Meeting host, thanked everyone for attending and encouraged them to return the next day for the Places of Refuge Roundtable.
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...
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